BREWINGTON FEDERAL LAWSUIT FILED AUGUST 19th

BREWINGTON FEDERAL LAWSUIT FILED AUGUST 19th

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
CASE NO. 1 :11 -cv- 1144SEB –DML

COMPLAINT AND JURY DEMAND
DANIEL BREWINGTON
2529 Sheridan Drive
Norwood, Ohio 45212 Plaintiff

-vs.-

F. AARON NEGANGARD,
individually and in his representative
capacity as Prosecutor of Dearborn
County, Indiana
215 West High Street
Lawrenceburg, Indiana 47025
and
MICHAEL KREINHOP,
individually and in his representative
capacity as Sheriff of Dearborn
County, Indiana
301 West High Street
Lawrenceburg, Indiana 47025
and
JAMES HUMPHREY
1406 Indian Woods Trail
Lawrenceburg, Indiana 47025
and
HEIDI HUMPHREY
1406 Indian Woods Trail
Lawrenceburg, Indiana 47025
and
ANGELA LOECHEL
310 West High Street
Lawrenceburg, Indiana 47025
and
EDWARD J. CONNOR
34 Erlanger Road
Erlanger, Kentucky
and
DEARBORN COUNTY, INDIANA
c/o Andrew Baudendistel
Dearborn County Attorney
230 West High Street
Lawrenceburg, Indiana 47025
and
John Does, 1 through 25
names & addresses unknown
Defendants

Now comes the Plaintiff, by and through undersigned counsel, and for his
complaint states as follows:

PARTIES
1 Plaintiff, Daniel Brewington, is a resident of the City of Norwood, Hamilton County, Ohio, and is currently housed in the Dearborn County Law Enforcement Center, Dearborn County, Indiana, and is referred to throughout this complaint as Brewington.
2. Defendant F. Aaron Negangard is/was the prosecutor for Dearborn County, Indiana, and, upon information and belief, is a resident of Dearborn County, Indiana, at all times pertinent to this complaint and is referred to throughout this complaint as Negangard.
3. Defendant Michael Kreinhop was the chief deputy of the Dearborn County Sheriffs Department, the sheriff of Dearborn County, or a detective assigned to the Special Crimes Unit located in Dearborn County, Indiana, at all times pertinent to this complaint and, upon information and belief, is a resident of Dearborn County, Indiana, at all times pertinent to this complaint and is referred to throughout this complaint as Kreinhop.
4. Defendant James Humphrey is an individual who resides in Dearborn County, Indiana, and is the husband of Defendant Heidi Humphrey, and is referred to throughout this complaint as J. Humphrey.
5. Defendant Heidi Humphrey is an individual who resides in Dearborn County, Indiana, and is the wife of Defendant James Humphrey, and is referred to throughout this complaint as H. Humphrey.
6. Defendant Edward J. Connor is an individual who resides in the Commonwealth of Kentucky, holds himself out to the public as a psychologist and performs custody evaluations for courts in the State of Indiana and is referred to throughout this complaint as Connor.
7. Angela Loechel is an attorney licensed to practice law in the State of Indiana at all times pertinent to this complaint and is referred to throughout this complaint as Loechel.
8. Defendant John Does 1 through 25 are unknown defendants, male and female, whose identities through due diligence could not be discovered prior to the filing of this complaint but are individuals who conspired and participated with Defendants Negangard, Kreinhop, J. Humphrey, H. Humphrey, Connor and Loechel to deprive Brewington of rights guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States, the United States Code, the laws of the State of Ohio, and the laws of the State of Indiana.
9. Defendant Dearborn County, Indiana, is a corporation organized pursuant to, inter alia, Title 36 of the Indiana Code.
JURISDICTION
10. This action arises under the First Amendment, the Sixth Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution; 18 U.S.C. §241; and 42 U.S.C.
3 §§1983, 1985 and 1986; and the common law of Indiana.
11. Jurisdiction over Counts II, Ill and IV of this action is conferred on this Court by 42 U.S.C. §§1985, 1986, and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended 42
U.S.C. §2000e et seq., respectively, and 28 U.S.C. §1331 because the actions arise under the laws of the United States. Jurisdiction over the state law claims is invoked pursuant
to the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction.
12. Venue is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1391 in the Southern District of Indiana, Southern District, because Defendant Dearborn County is doing business at 215 West High Street, Lawrenceburg, Indiana, and all other Defendants are residents of Dearborn County, Indiana, and some of the claims alleged herein arose in Dearborn County, Indiana.
FACTS
13. Brewington married Melissa Brewington on August 10, 2002, and two children were born of the marriage: M.B., born October 30, 2003, and A.B., born February 6, 2006.
14. Melissa Brewington filed a petition for dissolution of marriage in the Ripley County Circuit Court on January 8, 2007.
15. Judge Carl Taul, Judge of the Ripley Circuit Court, was assigned to hear the Plaintiffs divorce and later recused himself from hearing the Plaintiffs divorce action as the result of ex parte communications with the Defendant Connor.
16. Prior to Judge Taul recusing himself from the Plaintiffs divorce, Taul issued an order filed February 28, 2007 with the Ripley County, Indiana Clerk, awarding temporary custody of the Plaintiffs two minor children to Melissa Brewington and granting the Plaintiff visitation with the minor children.
17. After Judge Taul's order of February 28, 2007, the Plaintiff exercised parenting time with Plaintiffs minor children every Wednesday, Friday, and every third Monday beginning at 6:25 a.m. and ending at 8:00 a.m. the following day, without interruption or any intervention by the Court.
18. Plaintiff additionally exercised equal parenting time to the children's mother, Melissa Brewington, on weekends with parenting time commencing on Friday at 6:25 a.m. and ending on Sunday evening at 8:00 p.m. without interruption or any intervention by the Court.
19. In addition to Plaintiffs parenting time set forth in paragraphs 17 and 18, the Plaintiff also provided childcare for the children when the children's mother was unavailable to care for the children rather than have the children placed in daycare.
20. The Plaintiffs parenting time set forth in paragraphs 17 and 18 continued throughout the divorce action until the filing of the final decree issued by Judge James Humphrey on August 18, 2009.
21. On or about May 14, 2007, Plaintiff and Melissa Brewington signed an agreed order for a custody evaluation to be performed by Defendant Connor at Connor and Associates, PLLC.
22. The Plaintiffs custody evaluation described in paragraph 21 commenced on June 5, 2007.
23. Defendant Connor was not licensed to practice psychology by the State of Indiana when Judge Taul assigned the Defendant Connor as a custody evaluator to the Plaintiffs divorce case.
24. Defendant Connor failed to disclose to Brewington that Defendant Connor was not licensed to practice psychology in the State of Indiana at the time Connor was
assigned to conduct the custody investigation in Brewington's divorce action.
25. Defendant Connor was repeatedly assigned as a custody evaluator for domestic relations cases in Southeast Indiana and appointed to perform psychological evaluations in criminal cases in Southeast Indiana although Defendant Connor was not licensed to practice psychology in Indiana, and none of the Defendants determined the licensing of Defendant Connor to practice psychology in the State of Indiana prior to Connor's assignment or engagement to perform psychology services in the State of Indiana. If the Defendants did determine the licensing status of Defendant Connor in Indiana, the Defendants appointed Defendant Connor despite his not being licensed to practice psychology in the State of Indiana.
26. The Plaintiff was unaware that the Defendant Connor was not licensed to practice psychology in the State of Indiana when assigned to the Plaintiffs domestic relations case by Judge Taul. If the Plaintiff had been aware of the unlicensed status of Defendant Connor, the Plaintiff would have objected to the appointment of Defendant Connor.
27. The Plaintiff signed a contract with Defendant Connor to serve as an impartial expert in a custody evaluation on June 18, 2007. A copy of said contract is attached hereto and marked Exhibit A. Defendant Connor did not advise the Plaintiff that Defendant Connor was not licensed in the State of Indiana, and Defendant Connor concealed his unlicensed status from Brewington.
28. The Defendant Connor's contract provided that Defendant Connor would provide to the Plaintiffs attorney a copy of the case file from the custody evaluation performed.
29. Defendant Connor, after the Plaintiff executed the contract described in Exhibit A, sent a letter to Judge Taul on April 16, 2008, wherein Defendant Connor confirmed that the Plaintiffs contract described in Exhibit A stated Defendant Connor would release the case file to the representing attorney.
30. Defendant Connors contract with the Plaintiff provided the cost of copying the case file is ten cents a page, postage fees, and a twenty dollar office fee, which the Plaintiff or his counsel was willing to pay at all times pertinent hereto.
31. Defendant Connor, during the course of the custody evaluation process, interviewed the Plaintiffs ex-wife, Melissa Brewington, Melissa Brewington's parents (on three occasions), and Melissa Brewington's sister, Jennifer Smith (on one occasion).
32. Defendant Connors evaluation report alleged that Connor reviewed Melissa Brewington's health records from two health care professionals, letters from a work supervisor and a coworker, and a letter from Jennifer Smith.
33. Defendant Connor did not attempt to contact or review any information from any of Plaintiffs references, family members, or health care providers, although the Plaintiff provided the contact information to the Defendant Connor.
34. Defendant Connor released a child custody evaluation report on the Plaintiffs divorce on August 29, 2007 to Judge Taul of Ripley County, in the State of Indiana.
35. Defendant Connors custody evaluation report recommended that Melissa Brewington should have sole custody of the Plaintiff's minor children, M.B. and A.B., but Defendant Connor recommended that Plaintiff continue to care for the children every Wednesday, Friday, every third Monday, and equal weekends with Melissa Brewington.
36. Defendant Connor was not a licensed psychologist in the State of Indiana or a licensed medical professional in any state at the time of the delivery of the custody evaluation report to Judge Taul of Ripley County, Indiana.
37. Defendant Connor's custody evaluation opined that Plaintiffs "extreme Attention Deficit Disorder' and very high Ritalin dosage was a major reason as to why joint custody was not an option for the Plaintiff.
38. Defendant Connors custody evaluation report is devoid of any example or conduct of the Plaintiffs ADHD that negatively impacted Plaintiffs parenting ability, nor does it identity any health care professional who spoke with Connor concerning any medical condition or disability of the Plaintiff.
39. Defendant Connor failed to contact Plaintiffs treating therapist, medical doctor, or any other health care professional to address any concerns about Plaintiffs treatment for ADHD and/or prescription history to determine if the Plaintiffs prescription level for Ritalin was "very high" to determine whether Plaintiffs Ritalin use was "very high."
40. Defendant Connor failed to report to the Plaintiffs physician or therapist to any regulatory agency or board concerning improper treatment or for over-prescribing medication to the Plaintiff as alluded to in the case evaluation report prepared by Connor.
41. The Plaintiff reviewed Defendant Connor's initial custody evaluation and determined that the evaluation was riddled with errors, misstatements, and lies when it was submitted to Judge Taul, including but not limited to the following:
A. Listed an attempted telephone call to Plaintiff's brother "Mark" on August 10, 2007, and the Plaintiff does not have a brother named Mark.
B. Failed to include a telephone conversation with Plaintiffs treating therapist, Anita Dempsy, at The Affinity Center.
C. Failed to include in the evaluation that Defendant Connor advised Anita Dempsy that she did not have to provide Defendant Connor with a summary of Plaintiffs treatment at The Affinity Center.
D. Failed to include any references to interviews with the Plaintiff which took place on June 26, 2007 and August 9, 2007.
E. Alleged the Defendant Connor reviewed numerous court records and bank statements indicating that Plaintiff transferred $510.00 into Plaintiffs checking account on November 13, 2006, and there are no records of any withdrawal of any monies on November 13, 2006.
F. Defendant Connor claimed that he reviewed a packet of information compiled and authored by "Plaintiff' which included a letter from Melissa Brewington's counselor, Mary Jo Pollock, and the Plaintiff was never in possession of a letter from Mary Jo Pollock.
G. Defendant Connor stated that Plaintiff claimed to take the children to half of the children's doctor visits, and the Plaintiff made no such statement to the Defendant Connor, as court documents and testimony demonstrate that Plaintiff did not take children to half of the doctor visits.
H. Defendant Connor stated that Plaintiff took "a very high dose" of Ritalin, but Defendant Connor is not trained in the correct dose of Ritalin and not qualified to make any such determination.
I. Failed to communicate with the Plaintiffs treating doctor at the Affinity Center or review Plaintiff's prescription drug history.
J. Defendant Connor stated "Of concern, is that Plaintiff would drink any alcohol at all given the high dosage of Ritalin he is taking." Defendant Connor has no training concerning the interaction of Ritalin with alcohol nor any information that the Plaintiff consumed alcohol while taking Ritalin.
K. Defendant Connor failed to consult with Plaintiff's treating physician or therapist regarding concerns with alcohol negatively impacting Plaintiffs prescription use of Ritalin.
L. Defendant Connor never scheduled an appointment to meet with Plaintiffs mother.
M. Defendant Connor claimed that Plaintiff stated that he had applied for a concealed carry permit on November 6, 2006. Said statement is a lie and it was never investigated by Defendant Connor.
N. Defendant Connor stated how Melissa Brewington's sister described M.B. "as an average four-year-old who plays well with the other children" when the child was only three years old at the time of the interview.
0. Defendant Connor stated "Wife has no drug or alcohol history," although Melissa Brewington fled the scene of an accident in 1998 when she was intoxicated.
P. Defendant Connor claimed that Plaintiff stated, "that [Wife] does not allow him [Plaintiff] to have the girls for three overnights in a row," to which Wife responded "She does not decide this and that their work schedules dictate this more than anything else."
42. In a letter to Judge Taul dated February 21, 2008, Defendant Connor stated, "Plaintiffs documents indicate that there are numerous errors and oversights in our report," and Defendant Connor recommended conducting additional sessions to correct the errors in the evaluation at the parties' expense.
43. Defendant Connor sent repeated communications to Judge Taul during the Plaintiffs divorce action without sending the communication to the Plaintiff and without the Plaintiffs knowledge in an attempt to conceal the Defendant Connor's incompetence in the preparation of the case evaluation report.
44. Plaintiff, having reviewed Defendant Connors custody evaluation report, attempted to secure the case file of Defendant Connor to determine what work, investigation, or interviews were actually conducted by the Defendant Connor based on the error-ridden report that the Defendant Connor had initially produced to Judge Taul. and the Defendant Connor refused to produce the case file to the Plaintiff although the Plaintiff was appearing pro se in the divorce action.
45. Defendant Connor sent a letter dated February 25, 2008 to the Plaintiffs attorney and to Melissa Brewington's attorney advising the Plaintiff that "with this letter please be advised that Hon. Judge Carl Taul contacted me on 2/22/08 to convey his agreement for the review of the above-captioned case."
46. Defendant Connors contact with Judge Taul was not disclosed to the Plaintiff at any time, and Defendant Connors ex parte communication with Judge Taul on February 22, 2008 does not appear on the record of the Clerk of Courts of Ripley County, Indiana.
47. Plaintiff, after becoming aware of the Defendant Connor's ex parte contact with Judge Taul on February 25, 2008, made his first request for a copy of the evaluation case file from the Defendant Connor.
48. Defendant Connor sent a letter to the Plaintiff dated March 11, 2008, refusing to provide the Plaintiff with the evaluation case file related to the Plaintiffs divorce case.
49. Defendant Connor, in refusing to provide the Plaintiff with the custody evaluation file, stated that the custody evaluation file cannot be released to the Plaintiff without Melissa Brewington's consent, as the evaluation case file contains confidential information about her as well as the Plaintiffs children.
50. On March 26, 2008, the Defendant Connor changed his position concerning the release of the case evaluation file and advised the Plaintiff that he would release the case evaluation file if Defendant Connor received verification from the Court of the Plaintiffs pro se status. Once Defendant Connor received confirmation of the pro se status of the Plaintiff, the Defendant Connor "would be happy to" release the chart records to Plaintiff.
51. On or about March 26, 2008, Defendant Taul advised Defendant Connor that the Plaintiff filed an appearance naming himself as Plaintiffs own attorney, L e., the Plaintiff was pro se in the divorce action.
52. Defendant Connor once again changed his position on release of the custody evaluation file upon learning of the Plaintiffs pro se status, and he refused to provide the Plaintiff with the case evaluation file after the letter from Judge Taul advising the Defendant Connor of the Plaintiffs pro se status in the divorce case.
53. Defendant Connor on April 1, 2008, once again wrote to Judge Taul without communicating with the parties, notifying Judge Taul that, based on Judge Taul's letter dated March 26, 2008 in which he stated that Plaintiff is entitled to the evaluation only, that Defendant Connor will not be releasing the case file to Plaintiff.
54. At no time did Judge Taul place a protective order of record in the Plaintiff's divorce case that prohibited Defendant Connor from releasing the custody evaluation case file to the Plaintiff.
55. Plaintiff, on April 4, 2008, filed a motion in his own divorce action to permit release of Defendant Connors case file, and Judge Taul set Plaintiffs motion for hearing on June 13, 2008.
56. Defendant Connor wrote a letter to Judge Taul dated April 16, 2008 affirming the Defendant Connors contract with the Plaintiff, and Defendant Connor stated that "Plaintiff is correct in stating that our (Plaintiff Brewington and Defendant Connor) contract indicates we would provide the file to the representing attorney. However, given the circumstances, we believe that a Court order is necessary to release the file to Plaintiff, given that he is representing himself pro se."
57. Judge Taul, during the June 13, 2008 hearing on Plaintiffs motion to release the case evaluation file, stated that "the Order to [Connor] to release was to release that which Defendant Connor was obligated to do under Kentucky law," and Judge Taul was not going to undertake ruling on the matter because Judge Taul stated he was "not familiar with what obligations Defendant Connor has under Kentucky law."
58. Judge Taul appointed the unlicensed Defendant Connor as the case evaluator without determining whether the Defendant Connor was licensed in the State of Indiana or qualified to conduct a custody evaluation in the State of Indiana, and he failed to enforce Indiana law in deference to the unlicensed Defendant Connors interpretation of Kentucky law.
59. Judge Taul appointed an unlicensed custody investigator and impaired, impeded, and hindered the Plaintiffs ability to a fair trial by appointment of an unlicensed custody investigator, and Judge Taul refused to permit the release of the case evaluation file based on Kentucky law while the Plaintiffs case was pending in an Indiana Court.
60. Judge Taul did not place of record any order requiring the Plaintiff or any party to the Plaintiffs divorce action to follow the laws of Kentucky concerning custody evaluations.
61. At the June 13, 2008 hearing before Judge Taul, Melissa Brewington's counsel, Angela Loechel, submitted a signed Office Policy Statement from Connor and Associates to urge the Court not to release the case evaluation file to the Plaintiff, but the Plaintiff never signed the Office Policy Statement presented to the Court by Angela Loechel, and the Defendant Connor never presented the Office Policy Statement to the Plaintiff for signature at any time during the custody evaluation process.
62 Defendant Connor finally obtained a license to practice psychology in the State of Indiana on July 8, 2008.
63. After Defendant Connor obtained a license to practice psychology in the State of Indiana, Judge Taul made no further mention of following Kentucky law concerning the release of the custody evaluation file.
64. Judge Taul, after stating he was unaware of Kentucky law at the June hearing, filed an order on July 21, 2008 denying the Plaintiffs motion to permit release of the custody evaluation file stating, "The Court does not believe it appropriate to order the divulsion of a physician or therapist's entire file, without citing one case to support his position or legal justification for his ruling."
65. The Defendant Connor was neither a licensed physician nor therapist in the State of Indiana when the report was prepared or when he acquired information.
66. Judge Taul's order dated July 21, 2008 stated that Plaintiff was not specific as to what information Plaintiff was seeking to obtain from Defendant Connors custody evaluation case file as a basis for denying the Plaintiff the file prepared by Defendant Connor.
67. Plaintiff was unable to articulate for Judge Taul the items sought to be reviewed from the custody evaluation file in the possession of Defendant Connor, as the Plaintiff was unaware of the contents and therefore could not identify the documents the Plaintiff sought to review.
68. Defendant Connor, in a letter dated August 4, 2008, advised the Plaintiff that the custody evaluation file would not be released without a court order from Judge Taul or the consent of Melissa Brewington per state and HIPAA laws and regulations.
69. The Plaintiff became increasingly exasperated with the ex parte contacts between the Defendant Connor and Judge Taul, the refusal to release the custody evaluation file to the Plaintiff to prepare for trial, appointment of an unlicensed psychologist to conduct the custody evaluation, and the endless hurdles placed in the path of the Plaintiff to obtain the case file of Defendant Connor by Judge Taul to protect Defendant Connor and place the Plaintiff at a disadvantage in the trial of the Defendant's divorce case.
70. On September 3, 2008, Plaintiff created a website, www.dadsfamilycourtexperience.com , to share his experiences with Defendant Connor's conflicting statements in the custody evaluation Defendant Connor had prepared and provided to the Court purporting to be accurate in the Plaintiffs divorce case, the errors contained in Defendant Connors report, the machinations of Judge Taul concerning the release of the custody evaluation report, and the actions of Judge Taul instructing the Plaintiff to follow the laws of the State of Kentucky concerning the release of the custody evaluation report.
71. The Plaintiff was appearing pro se in the divorce action on September 3, 2008, and Judge Taul permitted the Plaintiff to be treated as counsel of record for some issues and denied the Plaintiff the rights accorded counsel for a party in other circumstances with the issuance of orders such as "Delivery to counsel is the same as delivery to the party personally, but refused to order the release of the custody investigation file to the Plaintiff."
72. Defendant Connor sent a letter to Plaintiff dated September 9, 2008, advising the Plaintiff that Defendant Connor did not have a "signed Office Policy Statement for you (Plaintiff) on file" and the Office Policy Statement was never provided to the Plaintiff to sign, which Defendant Connor acknowledged.
73. Defendant Connor has attempted to characterize documents generated by his office, such as the "Office Policy Statement" as an "adjunct document to the Court order in which you (Plaintiff) and Ms. Brewington agreed to participate fully in a custody evaluation to be conducted at this office."
74. Defendant Connor sent another ex parte communication to Judge Taul on September 10, 2008 and attached a letter Defendant Connor sent to the Plaintiff dated September 9, 2008. In the communication to Judge Taul, Defendant Connor attacked the Plaintiff for the following:
A. Questioning the Defendant Connors sloppy office practices and the poor quality of Defendant Connor's report, despite the numerous errors contained in the custody evaluation report.
B. Defendant Connors failure to be properly licensed in the State of Indiana to practice psychology.
C. Defendant Connor testifying in Indiana courts when the Defendant Connor was not licensed to practice psychology in Indiana courts.
D. Defendant Connor accepting appointments to conduct psychological evaluations from Indiana courts when the Defendant Connor was not licensed in Indiana, and the Indiana courts' failure to determine the Defendant Connors ability to practice psychology in Indiana prior to the Defendant Connors appointment by the judiciary of the State of Indiana.
75. Defendant Connor, in the September 10, 2008 letter to Judge Taul, attacked the Plaintiff for the Plaintiffs refusal to accept Defendant Connors failure to be licensed as inconsequential, failure to accept the Defendant Connors slipshod custody evaluation as fact, when it was riddled with error, and the Plaintiffs failure to accept the deliberate false statements in Defendant Connors custody evaluation file as factually accurate.
76. Defendant Connor stated to Judge Taul in the September 10, 2008 letter that Defendant Connor was disturbed by the Plaintiffs failure to accept as inconsequential the Defendant Connors unlicensed status in Indiana, the overreaching of the Defendant Connor to assert as fact medical opinions concerning the medications taken by the Plaintiff when the Defendant Connor has no medical training, the refusal of the Plaintiff to accept the Defendant Connor's ex parte communications with the trial judge as inconsequential, and the deliberate false statements in the custody evaluation report prepared by Defendant Connor as innocent errors or simply incompetence.
77. Defendant Connor, using a thought process known only to Defendant Connor, found it perplexing that the Plaintiff failed to recognize the Defendant Connor as professional despite being unlicensed to practice psychology in Indiana, refusing to provide the custody evaluation file to the Plaintiff, the repeated ex parte communications with the Judge assigned to the Plaintiffs divorce case, and the Plaintiffs refusal to accept as fact statements in the custody evaluation report submitted by the Defendant Connor that the Plaintiff or any reasonable person knew to be false and that the Defendant Connor represented to the Court as truthful.
78. Plaintiff attempted to obtain a copy of the case evaluation file of Defendant Connor by filing a motion to compel Defendant Connor to deliver case evaluation file to Plaintiff.
79. Judge Taul stated in open court that the Defendant Connor was required to follow Kentucky law concerning the release of the custody evaluation file, and at a hearing on November 24, 2008 on Plaintiffs motion to compel, Taul stated, "I have previously ordered that you are not entitled to that case file."
80. Judge Taul interrupted Plaintiffs argument during the June 13, 2008 hearing claiming that the order instructed the Defendant Connor, at the time unlicensed in Indiana, to follow Kentucky law, and Judge Taul stated he was unaware of Connor's obligations under Kentucky law, although Judge Taul appointed the unlicensed Defendant Connor in an Indiana divorce case.
81. On December 5, 2008, Plaintiff filed his motion for a change of judge following numerous accounts of ex parte communication between Defendant Connor and Judge Taul and the indifference of the Indiana judiciary to the appointment of an unlicensed psychologist practicing in the Indiana courts and to permit the Plaintiff to adequately prepare for trial.
82. On December 5, 2008, Judge Taul recused himself from the Plaintiffs divorce case and issued an order naming a three-judge panel for the parties to strike for the selection of the succeeding judge to hear the Plaintiffs divorce action.
83. On December 15, 2008, Plaintiff filed his motion in limine requesting the Court to exclude "any evaluation reports, letters, testimony, and or other evidence relating to the child custody evaluation performed by Defendant Connor of Connor and Associates PLLC" due to the ex parte communication between Defendant Connor and the Court, and Plaintiffs inability to obtain a copy of Defendant Connors case file because Plaintiff was acting as his own attorney.
84. On December 17, 2008, an order was issued naming Dearborn Circuit Judge James D. Humphrey as Special Judge, and Judge Humphrey accepted the appointment on December 29, 2008.
85. The appointment of Judge Humphrey proved to be problematic, as he possessed as little respect for the Plaintiffs rights as a litigant as Judge Taul.
86. In a letter to the Kentucky Board of Examiners of Psychology dated, December 22, 2008, Defendant Connor stated that he consulted with "two professional peers experienced with ADHD treatment" concerning Plaintiffs Ritalin prescription.
However, Defendant Connor refused to disclose the identity of the individuals, and the Plaintiff never had the opportunity to determine whether the "two professional peers" ever
existed, consulted with Connor or possessed the ability to assess the Plaintiffs Ritalin use.
87. Defendant Connor has continued to refuse to disclose the "professional peers" consulted through and including the current date.
88. Defendant Connor refused to provide the Plaintiff with the custody evaluation case file to enable the Plaintiff to prepare for trial and to review the competency or lack thereof of the Defendant Connors evaluation, and the judge (Humphrey) appointed to replace Judge Taul denied the Plaintiff the right to examine the custody investigation file.
89. Defendant Connor lied to the Plaintiff during the course of the Plaintiffs divorce by asserting in written correspondence to the Plaintiff the "Office Policy Statement" was an adjunct document to the Court order and then testifying at Plaintiffs divorce trial on May 27, 2009 the "Office Policy Statement" was not an adjunct document to the Court order.
90. Defendant Connor testified at the Plaintiffs divorce trial that the "Office Policy Statement" was an "adjunct document" to the custody evaluation, then the Defendant Connor testified "It's an adjunct — it's not an adjunct to a court order. It's -- it's adjacent to what we do when people come in" which was a fabrication at best and a deliberate misstatement by Defendant Connor to attempt to portray himself as competent to the Court.
91. Defendant Connor provided the "Office Policy Statement" to the Melissa Brewington's attorney prior to the June 13, 2008 hearing before Judge Taul to prevent the release of Defendant Connor's custody evaluation file without the Plaintiffs knowledge and then testified at the trial that Melissa Brewington's signing of the document was incorrect and not valid.
92. Defendant Connor attacked Plaintiff at trial for alleging that Defendant Connor's conduct was unethical and/or illegal when the Defendant Connor knew or should have known that he had failed to comply with the terms of the contract between Plaintiff and Defendant and attacked the Plaintiffs postings related to Defendant Connor on the Internet.
93. Judge Humphrey referenced Connor's letter dated December 22, 2008 in a May 14, 2009 order denying the Plaintiffs motion in limine.
94. Judge Humphrey prohibited the Plaintiff from questioning Connor concerning the December 22, 2008 letter during Connor's testimony on May 27, 2009, although Defendant Connors letter is untruthful concerning Defendant Connors repeated refusal to release the case evaluation file on repeated occasions, including but not limited to, 3/11/2008, 3/27/2008, 4/1/2008, 4/16/2008, 8/4/2008, 9/9/2008,10/2/2009 and 11/11/2009.
95. On January 9, 2009, Judge Humphrey scheduled a final hearing on the Plaintiffs divorce case for May 27, 2009.
96. On February 24, 2009, Judge Humphrey set a hearing for April 29, 2009 on Plaintiffs motion in limine.
97. Judge Humphrey delayed a hearing on Plaintiffs motion in limine until February 24, 2009, although the motion was filed on December 15, 2008.
98. Plaintiff created the web blog "www.danbrewington.blogspot.com " on or about 12/15/2008 to share Plaintiffs court experiences and dealings with Defendant Connor with the public.
99. Plaintiff issued a subpoena for Judge Taul to expose Defendant Connor's ex parte contacts with the Court and the deliberate misrepresentations of Defendant Connor to the Court and to establish that Judge Taul's own actions in engaging in ex parte communications with Defendant Connor precipitated the need for Taul's testimony during the final hearing.
100. Judge Humphrey quashed the Plaintiffs attempt to subpoena Judge Taul and denied Plaintiffs motion to reconsider quashing the subpoena filed on April 16, 2009.
101. On April 16, 2009, Melissa Brewington filed a motion for temporary restraining order, requesting Judge Humphrey to force the Plaintiff to cease and desist in publishing information about the proceedings on the Internet and also requested that Judge Humphrey force Plaintiff to remove any previous content from the blog/website created by the Plaintiff.
102. On April 29, 2009, Humphrey heard arguments on Plaintiffs motion in limine and Wife's motion for temporary restraining order
103. During the hearing on Wife's motion for temporary restraining order, Humphrey asked Plaintiff, "What is of primary concern here to you, getting this message out through the Internet or whatever might be in the best interest of your children?"
104. Humphrey indicated without any evidence that he believed that the interests of the parties' minor children were somehow adverse to Plaintiffs Internet writings regarding the Court and Defendant Connor.
105. Humphrey denied Plaintiffs oral motion, during the April 29, 2009 hearing, to appoint a guardian ad litem to represent the children's best interests.
106. Humphrey denied the Plaintiffs motion in limine and wife's motion for temporary restraining order.
107. During the April 29, 2009 hearing, Judge Humphrey interrogated Plaintiff about what part of Defendant Connor's case file Plaintiff was seeking access to, and Plaintiff continued to state that Plaintiff wanted the entire case file as provided in IC § 31-17-2-12, since in the absence of the ability to review the file, it is impossible to determine if any psychological and/or medical information is contained in the file.
108. The Defendants Humphrey and Connor cannot point to any evidence that Plaintiffs Internet writings pose any risk to the Plaintiffs children or any children, and Plaintiffs writings are critical of Judge Humphrey and the Defendant Connor concerning their reasoning or lack thereof and the slovenly and unlawful administration of justice in Dearborn County, Indiana.
109. The Plaintiff, observing the lack of judicial integrity on the part of Judge Humphrey, filed a motion on May 21, 2009, to withdraw his appearance in the divorce action and sought the assistance of the Court to obtain counsel for the following reasons:
A. Defendant Connor's evaluation stated that Defendant Connor had difficulties communicating with Plaintiff because of Plaintiffs ADHD.
B. Connor's letter to Taul dated 9/10/2008 stated, it is very perplexing that he is unable to understand or accept the basic premise of confidentiality that protects Ms. Brewington's records from being released without her consent or without a Court order."
C. As Defendant Connor claimed that he could barely communicate with Plaintiff and Plaintiff was unable to understand matters concerning confidentiality, Plaintiff requested an interpreter or representative to assist Plaintiff in understanding Defendant Connors complex policies.
D. Connor indicated that Plaintiffs ADHD inhibited Plaintiffs ability to understand procedures dealing with the legal process.
E. Plaintiffs motion stated, "It would be a violation of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act to force the [Plaintiff] to represent himself in court if he was unable to fairly participate due to a disability as diagnosed by the Defendant Connor."
110. On May 29, 2009, Judge Humphrey denied Plaintiffs motion to withdraw his appearance in the divorce action.
111. Judge Humphrey denied professional assistance to assist Plaintiff with the Plaintiffs alleged disability (ADHD) that made it difficult for the Plaintiff to comprehend legal matters concerning Defendant Connors confidentiality policies, the policies of the Court to protect Defendant Connor, and to deny the Plaintiff meaningful access to the courts, according to Defendant Connors communication.
112. The final hearing on the Plaintiffs divorce took place on May 27, June 2, and June 3, 2009.
113. Defendant Connor testified on May 27, 2009 in the divorce action, the Plaintiff objected to the admission of Defendant Connors evaluation and testimony at the trial as the Plaintiff did not receive a copy of the custody evaluation case file per IC § 31-17-2-12.
114. Judge Humphrey admitted the Defendant Connor's evaluation and Defendant Connors testimony in the divorce trial.
115. Defendant Connor testified that he did not see a problem with Plaintiff continuing to care for the Plaintiffs children and that "As far as I'm able to discern about the safety issues of the children [while in the care of Plaintiff], that seems to be fairly okay. My concerns are more so with the — the — with [Plaintiffs] personality in trying to cooperate in
any type of a joint custody arrangement. That is my primary concern."
116. Defendant Connor testified that Plaintiff never made any false accusations against the children's mother. Defendant Connor testified that he did not observe any harassing or threatening behavior by Plaintiff during the evaluation process. Defendant Connor testified that Plaintiff properly handled the medical needs of the parties' children, and Defendant Connor testified that the parties' children could suffer emotional trauma if the children's time with their father were reduced or eliminated. Defendant Connor testified, "I think our recommendation indicates that the children do love [the Plaintiff] and that [the Plaintiff] love[s] the children. There is a bond there."
117. Defendant Connor was the only "professional" to offer evidence and/or testify in matters pertaining to the parties' children.
118. No witness who testified during the course of the three (3)-day final hearing provided evidence or testimony indicating that the Plaintiff abused, neglected, or mistreated the parties' minor children. There was no evidence or testimony that Plaintiff ever refused the mother parenting time with children. There were no accusations that the Plaintiff was ever delinquent on child support payments.
119. In the time between the provisional hearing by Judge Taul on 2/9/2007 and the final hearing by Judge Humphrey on 5/27/2009, 6/2/2009 and 6/3/2009, no one contacted social services or petitioned the Court to modify Plaintiffs parenting time or made any claims of parental neglect or abuse by the Plaintiff.
120. There was no evidence presented during the divorce action by Melissa Brewington to terminate the Plaintiffs parenting time with the minor children.
121. There were no accusations in the divorce that Plaintiff ever harassed Melissa Brewington at home, work, in public, or any other location, or her family, friends, coworkers, or any party to the action.
122. After the final hearing in the divorce, the Plaintiff continued to care for his children with the same parenting schedule that had been followed since March 2007.
123. On August 18, 2009, Judge Humphrey entered a judgment and final order on the decree of dissolution of marriage, finding the Plaintiff "to be irrational, dangerous and in need of significant counseling before he can conduct himself as a parent," and the Plaintiff shall not be entitled to visitation until he undergoes a mental health evaluation with a Mental Health Care Professional approved by the Court and the purpose "of this evaluation is to determine if he [Plaintiff] is a possible danger to the children, Wife, and/or to himself."
124. Judge Humphrey, after abusing his authority and office and in an attempt to require the Plaintiff to close his website, then stated, "If the Mental Health Care Provider determines that [Plaintiff] is not a danger to the children, Wife, and/or to himself, [Plaintiff] may have supervised visitation in a therapeutic setting for four (4) hours per week, in increments of two (2), two (2) hour visits per week" appointed himself a god to determine or "make this determination after reviewing the evaluation" and conditioned any motion for unsupervised visitation " with the children, upon compliance with the recommendations of Mental Health Provider and recommendations of the supervised visitation, that unsupervised visitation may safely occur with the children"and ordered the removal of all postings created by Plaintiff from the Internet concerning the children before any unsupervised visitation may commence and/or continue."
125. Judge Humphrey gave the following reasons for ordering the termination of Plaintiffs parenting time:
A. The Plaintiff has severe Attention Deficit Disorder that affects his ability to focus and concentrate.
B. He rambles and forgets and is given to impulsive and incoherent thought.
C. Could not communicate with mother with the skills necessary to conduct joint custody, The Psychometric Test Results of the Plaintiff reported in the Confidential Custody Evaluation of August 29, 2007.
D. Defendant Connors testimony indicates that Plaintiff has a degree of psychological disturbance that is concerning and does not lend itself to proper parenting.
E. The Plaintiffs writings are similar to those of individuals who have committed horrendous crimes against their families.
F. Plaintiff has posted information about the dissolution proceeding on his website, on his blog, and on various other sites, and continued to post information even after the hearing for a temporary restraining order wherein the Court's Order stated that the Court may also consider evidence presented at this hearing regarding the temporary restraining order in regard to the Court's decision as to visitation and custody and how Plaintiffs actions may affect the best interest of the children now and in the future.
126. Judge Humphrey made his decision on the content of Plaintiffs Internet writings critical of the Defendant Connor and the deficient administration of justice in the Plaintiffs divorce action to strip the Plaintiff of his parental rights and impose draconian hurdles for the Plaintiff to see/visit with his children without evidence that the Plaintiff presented a risk to the children.
127. The Plaintiff, once he received the decision of Judge Humphrey, continued to post on his blog/website concerning his opinion of Defendant Connor, Judge Humphrey, the administration of justice in Southeast Indiana, and the appointment of an unqualified custody investigator to the Plaintiffs divorce case.
128. At no time did Judge Humphrey during the process of the divorce feel intimidated, seek law enforcement assistance, or otherwise file a complaint with any law enforcement agency concerning the Plaintiffs conduct during the course of the trial.
129. Judge Humphrey terminated Plaintiffs parenting time because Plaintiff publicly stated that Connor did not tell the truth in the report submitted to the Court and for the Plaintiffs blog/website criticism of Defendant Connor and the acceptance of Defendant Connor's report as factually accurate, while Plaintiff was deprived the right to review the file prepared by Defendant Connor.
130. Judge Humphrey terminated Plaintiffs parenting time because of Plaintiffs "severe" ADHD, but he denied Plaintiffs petition for special courtroom assistance to help Plaintiff participate in the hearings, although ADHD is recognized by the Americans with Disabilities Act as a disability.
131. On August 23, 2009, the Plaintiff distributed a letter on the Internet explaining that Judge Humphrey terminated Plaintiffs parenting time without warning or any evidence of neglect, and he encouraged people to send letters of complaint/concern to the Indiana Supreme Court Ethics and Professionalism Committee Advisor located in Dearborn County.
132. Defendant Heidi Humphrey, wife of Defendant J. Humphrey, is the Committee Advisor in Dearborn County Indiana Supreme Court Ethics and Professionalism Committee
Advisor located in Dearborn County and one of only four such advisors total, who are wives of Judges, to serve on the Ethics and Professionalism Committee in the State of Indiana.
133. Appellate Justice Margaret Robb served as the foregoing Committee's liaison to the Indiana Court of Appeals.
134. Approximately one month after Plaintiff encouraged people to contact the Committee Advisor in Dearborn County Indiana Supreme Court Ethics and Professionalism Committee Advisor, the four advisors, who were wives of Judges, disappeared from the committee in their respective home counties.
135. Justice Robb would later rule on Plaintiffs appeal after the Plaintiff encouraged complaints about Judge Humphrey and after Justice Robb served with Defendant H. Humphrey on the Indiana Supreme Court Ethics and Professionalism Committee Advisor.
136. In a letter to Connor dated September 15, 2009, Plaintiffs attorney, in a separate legal action, requested a copy of Connor's case file for a legal hearing in Hamilton County, Ohio.
137. In a letter to the Plaintiffs Ohio attorney dated September 21, 2009, Connor stated, "Please be advised that [Plaintiff] was provided with copies of the records you are requesting and thus, should have them in his possession for your review."
138. In a letter to the Ohio attorney dated September 28, 2009, Connor stated, "I will have the records for [Plaintiff] prepared by Friday October 2, 2009."
139. Connor also stated in the September 28, 2009 letter, "However I am quite perplexed as to why this is necessary given that [Plaintiff] already has copies of all his records"
140. In a letter to the Ohio attorney dated October 2, 2009, Defendant Connor flipflopped again concerning the release of the custody evaluation file, and Defendant Connor informed the Ohio attorney that Connor was unable to release the records.
141. Connor stated in the October 2, 2009 letter, "After conducting a cursory review of the records you requested, it is apparent that there are numerous references to [Plaintiffs] children by name as well as information about the mother interspersed throughout the documents."
142. Connor stated that before he could release the records in the case file, the Ohio attorney needed to provide Connor with:
A. A Court order directing me to release the specific records to you"; OR
B. A consent form signed by the mother permitting me to release documents directly to you that contain information about her and the children."
143. The Plaintiff reported the activities of Defendant Connor and Humphrey on the Plaintiffs website concerning the divorce and Defendant Connors refusal to release his custody evaluation file to the Plaintiff.
144. Defendants Humphrey, Loechel, and Connor, in an attempt to have the Plaintiff shut down the Plaintiffs blog site, complained to the Dearborn County Prosecutor Negangard on or about August 24, 2009.
145. The Defendant Negangard was the head of the Dearborn County, Indiana Special Crimes Unit and assigned the complaints of Defendants Connor, Loechel, and Humphrey to Defendant Kreinhop to investigate concerning the Plaintiffs blog.
146. On October 8, 2009, Dearborn County Special Crimes Unit Detective Defendant Kreinhop contacted Plaintiff.
147. Kreinhop told Plaintiff that there was an investigation of Plaintiffs writings or postings on the Internet.
148. Kreinhop wanted the Plaintiff to meet Defendant Kreinhop in Dearborn County to discuss an alleged complaint about the Plaintiffs Internet postings.
149. Kreinhop refused to provide Plaintiff with any details of the investigation into the Plaintiffs Internet writings.
150. Kreinhop refused to tell Plaintiff who had filed the complaint.
151. Neither the Plaintiff nor Melissa Brewington had ever resided in Dearborn County, Indiana.
152. None of Plaintiffs Internet postings were transmitted from Dearborn County, Indiana, or the State of Indiana.
153. Plaintiffs Ohio attorney informed Defendant Kreinhop that Plaintiff would not meet with Kreinhop unless Kreinhop gave an explanation as to the nature of the case and what Kreinhop was investigating.
154. On October 13, 2009, Humphrey vacated a hearing set for October 27, 2009 stating that the Court did not have jurisdiction to hear the motion while the case was before the Indiana Appellate Court.
155. Defendant Humphrey failed to disclose that he made a complaint to Defendant Negangard concerning the Plaintiffs Internet postings and failed to recuse himself after complaining about the Plaintiffs Internet postings to Defendant Negangard.
156. On or about October 22, 2009, Connor communicated with Circuit Court and Loechel, unbeknownst to Plaintiff.
157. On or about November 2, 2009, Defendant Kreinhop traveled to Plaintiffs residence in Ohio, despite being advised by Plaintiffs Ohio counsel the Plaintiff would not speak with Defendant Kreinhop, to speak to Plaintiff.
158. Defendant Kreinhop disregarded Plaintiffs Ohio attorney's statements and traveled to Ohio to meet with Plaintiff. Kreinhop failed to notify the Ohio attorney or notify local law enforcement that Defendant Kreinhop was attempting to meet with Plaintiff.
160. Kreinhop informed Plaintiff that Kreinhop spoke with Connor about Plaintiff.
161. Connor did not have Plaintiffs consent to share Plaintiffs confidential information with Detective Kreinhop.
162. Kreinhop did not have a valid subpoena or court order that would have allowed Kreinhop to obtain information about Plaintiff while being a client of Connor.
163. In a November 11, 2009 letter to Plaintiffs Indiana appellate counsel, Kendra Gjerdingen, Connor stated, "In order for me to release the 'entire' case file, I will need a Court order that supersedes both the Honorable Judge Taul's order as well as the Honorable Judge Humphrey's order."
164. On January 19, 2010, Plaintiff filed a motion in his divorce case to release the custody evaluation case file from Connor and Associates to Dr. Henry Waite, MD.
165. Plaintiff requested that Dr. Waite be able to review the files to help Dr. Waite determine if Plaintiff presented a danger to the parties' children.
166. Humphrey denied Plaintiffs motion on January 28, 2010, although Defendant Humphrey was involved in reporting alleged criminal activity of the Plaintiff posting commentary on the Plaintiffs website, and once again Defendant Humphrey failed to mention his involvement in the investigation of the Plaintiff while Defendant Humphrey continued to issue orders in the Plaintiffs divorce case.
167. Humphrey stated that Plaintiff needed to seek permission from the Indiana Court of Appeals for Humphrey to consider Plaintiffs motion.
168. On or about March 9, 2010, Ryan P. Ray filed an appearance to represent Plaintiff in the Appellate Court in Indiana.
169. On or about March 11, 2010, Ryan P. Ray filed an appearance to represent Plaintiff in trial court.
170. On or about March 11, 2010, Ryan Ray filed a motion for relief from stay and request for approval of Dr. Henry Waite as mental health care provider in the divorce.
171. On or about March 19, 2010, Humphrey set a hearing on the motion for relief for June 14, 2010.
172. On or about April 5, 2010, Plaintiff filed a brief in the Indiana Appellate Court concerning Plaintiffs appeal of Judge Humphrey's decision in the Plaintiffs divorce case.
173. On or about May 1, 2010, Melissa Brewington filed her appellate brief in the Indiana Appellate Court.
174. On or about May 25, 2010, Plaintiff filed his reply brief in the Indiana Appellate Court.
175. On or about May 27, 2010, the Internet Protocol (IP) address registered to the Indiana Supreme Court appeared on www.danshelpskids.com ., the Internet website of the Plaintiff.
176. Supreme Court IP address 207.250.133.30 is registered through TW Telecom Holdings, Inc.
177. Supreme Court IP address 207.250.133.30 accounted for a total of 187 hits on 33 web pages on www.danhelpskids.com .
178. Supreme Court IP address 207.250.133.30 is one of two IP addresses registered to the Indiana Supreme Court that visited www.danhelpskids.com .
179. Plaintiff registered web domain www.danhelpskids.com on December 6, 2009, approximately four months after Defendant Humphrey issued the decree of divorce.
180. Plaintiff published the content on www.danhelpskids.com nearly six (6) months after the filing of the final decree.
181. The content of www.danhelpskids.com does not appear on the court record in any proceeding before Judge Humphrey.
182. On or about June 9, 2010, Humphrey phoned the attorneys of both parties to the divorce case to inform them of Humphrey's recusal due to an alleged police investigation of the Plaintiff started by Defendant Humphrey in August 2009.
183. On or about June 9, 2010, Supreme Court IP address 207.250.133.30 visited www.danhelpskids.com .
184. On or about June 11, 2010, Humphrey's order of recusal was filed with the clerk.
185. Humphrey's order made no mention of the alleged investigation.
186. Humphrey stated that he recused himself "to avoid any appearance of impropriety," although the appearance of impropriety did not prevent the Defendant Humphrey from ruling on prior motions filed post decree by the Plaintiff.
187. On or about June 23, 2010, the Plaintiffs appeal of his divorce case was transmitted to Indiana Court of Appeals.
188. On or about June 28, 2010, Judge Taul unilaterally appointed Judge John A. Westhafer of Decatur Circuit Court to the Plaintiff's divorce case.
189. On or about July 6, 2010, an order and qualification by Special Judge Westhafer, assuming jurisdiction of the case, was placed of record in the Plaintiffs divorce case.
190. On or about July 6, 2010, Plaintiff sent a public records request to Dearborn Prosecutor F. Aaron Negangard for the records pertaining to the alleged investigation of Plaintiff.
191. Defendant Negangard heads the Dearborn County Special Crimes Unit where the Defendant Kreinhop was assigned.
192. In a letter dated July 7, 2010, Prosecutor Negangard denied Plaintiffs request for records, stating Indiana law prohibits the release of investigatory records.
193. On or about July 12, 2010, Plaintiff sent a written response to Prosecutor Negangard's refusal to release records to the Defendant Negangard and other county officials.
194. Plaintiff in his letter dated July 12, 2010, informed Negangard that Indiana law does not prohibit the release of investigatory records.
195. IC 5-14-3-4 states that investigatory records of law enforcement agencies are subject to release at the discretion of the investigating agency.
196. At approximately 4:45 PM on July 12, 2010, Defendant Negangard sent Plaintiff an email that was addressed to "all county officials" from Negangard's Verizon Wireless Blackberry, that Defendant Negangard told Plaintiff that Negangard would "make every effort to prosecute" Plaintiff, if Plaintiff broke the law.
197. Defendant' Negangard's email stated the following:
"Please be advised that Dan Brewington is currently under investigation by the Dearborn County Sheriffs department. Once he (Plaintiff) was advised of this by Judge James Humphrey who had to recuse himself from his case only recently he has attacked me or my office. [sic] I take this an effort to get me not to do my job of prosecuting those who violate the law. I assure you his efforts will not succeed. If he has violated the law then I will make every effort to prosecute him. However I will point out that this matter is still under investigation and until such time he is convicted he is presumed innocent. [Plaintiff] is also incorrect regarding his request. He clearly asked for records pertaining to his investigation that are not to be disclosed under Indiana law. If any of you need any further information regarding this matter. Please do hesitate to contact me." [sic]
198. On July 13, 2010, Supreme Court IP address 207.250.133.30 visited www.danhelpskids.com .
199. On July 20, 2010, Supreme Court IP address 207.250.133.30 visited www.danhelpskids.com .
200. On or about July 20, 2010, the Indiana Appellate Court affirmed the trial court's ruling in the Plaintiffs divorce.
201. The Indiana Appellate Court stated in its opinion in the Plaintiffs divorce case, "During the pendency of the proceedings, Daniel posted information concerning the dissolution on his website and blog, in response to which Melissa sought a protective order and temporary restraining order on more than one occasion."
202. On September 9, 2010, Supreme Court IP address 207.250.133.30 visited www.danhelpskids.corn. and www.danbrewington.blogspot.com .
203. On or about September 27, 2010, Supreme Court IP address 207.250.133.30 visited www.danhelpskids.com .
204. On or about October 8, 2010, Plaintiffs petition to transfer his divorce case with the Indiana Supreme Court was filed.
205. On or about November 1, 2010, Supreme Court IP address 66.162.57.78 visited www.danhelpskids.com ., and it was the first time that IP address 66.162.57.78
appeared on www.danhelpskids.com , the foregoing IP address is registered to Indiana Supreme Court.
206. On or about November 17, 2010, the Plaintiffs Petition was transmitted on transfer to the Indiana Supreme Court.
207. On or about November 22, 2010, Supreme Court IP address 66.162.57.78 visited www.danhelpskids.com .
208. On or about December 16, 2010, the Indiana Supreme Court denied transfer of the Plaintiffs divorce action.
209. Defendant Negangard, acting as Prosecutor of Dearborn County, Indiana, had the Plaintiff indicted on or about March 7, 2011, for a variety of criminal charges all related to the Plaintiffs Internet postings.
210. That any prosecutor or lay person would recognize the well-established right of a citizen of the United States to exercise the First Amendment right to free speech.
211. That the Defendants, acting individually or collectively, conspired to deprive the Plaintiff of his rights guaranteed under the United States Constitution to free speech, and when the Plaintiff refused to take down his website, the Defendants conspired to have the Plaintiff investigated and arrested for exercising his First Amendment rights.
212. Once the Plaintiff was arrested, Defendant Dearborn County, Indiana, failed and refused to appoint the Plaintiff counsel at the Plaintiffs arraignment on the spurious charges perpetrated by Defendant Negangard in conjunction with the other named Defendants and John Doe Defendants and denied the Plaintiff the right to counsel or appointed counsel.
213. That Defendant Negangard or his employees sat quietly in the courtroom while the Plaintiff was denied the right to counsel and permitted the Plaintiff to be arraigned by a Judge (Blankenship) who is an acquaintance of the Defendant J. Humphrey and permitted the Judge to set a bond at $600,000.00 without any opposition by the Defendant Negangard or his employees, all while the Plaintiff was without counsel.
214. That the Plaintiff has been incarcerated in the Dearborn County Law Enforcement Center, Dearborn County, Indiana, since March 11, 2011 without the aid or assistance of counsel, and the Plaintiff has been denied access to counsel by the Defendant Kreinhop.
215. That the Defendants acted in concert to deprive the Plaintiff of his rights guaranteed under state and federal law.
216. Defendant Negangard continues to seek to restrain the Plaintiffs liberty through representations to the Court that are false in an attempt to require the Plaintiff to capitulate to a plea deal with Defendant Negangard.
217. That Defendants Negangard, Humphrey, and Loechel are all licensed attorneys in the State of Indiana and know or should know that the Plaintiffs Internet writings are protected speech, that Defendant Connor should know that the Plaintiffs Internet writings are protected free speech, that Defendant Negangard, as Prosecutor of Dearborn County and as a licensed attorney, knows or should know the consequences of incarcerating an individual when a crime has not been committed, and Defendant Krienhop, as the Sheriff of Dearborn County, Indiana, has a duty to prevent the Plaintiffs rights from being violated under state or federal law and stop criminal activity in Dearborn County, Indiana, and Dearborn County knows or should know its obligation to appoint counsel to an indigent defendant such as the Plaintiff in a criminal proceeding at all critical phases, and the Defendants did nothing.
218. That Defendant Negangard has attempted to continue to have the Plaintiff incarcerated for exercising rights guaranteed under the U.S. Constitution and the laws of the United States including, but not limited to, the Plaintiffs filing of a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and the Defendant Negangard's acknowledgment that the Plaintiffs postings on the Internet are protected speech. Defendant Negangard's problem is with the content of the speech critical of Defendant Negangard or elected officials in Dearborn County, Indiana.
219. Defendants acted knowingly and intentionally without regard to Plaintiffs legal rights in conspiring to deprive the Plaintiff of his liberty for Plaintiff's postings on the Internet/blogsite, that any average citizen would consider protected speech and the Defendants took action against the Plaintiff to purposely deprive the Plaintiff of rights guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution and the laws of the United States that are so grounded in history and legal jurisprudence it is common knowledge.
220. Defendants John Does 1-25 are unknown defendants whose names and addresses are unknown and with reasonable diligence could not be identified by the Plaintiff, but said defendants acted in concert with the Defendants in the foregoing actions.
221. That the named Defendants conspired in malicious combination in the foregoing acts and appeared in a grand jury proceeding or provided information to the Defendant Negangard that all Defendants knew or should have known was not criminal action by the Plaintiff but acted in concert to pursue criminal charges against the Plaintiff in an attempt to deprive the Plaintiff of his rights guaranteed under state and federal law.
222. Dearborn County, its officials, agents and employees exercised no oversight concerning the actions of the Defendants Negangard, Kreinhop, John Does employed by Dearborn County, Indiana, or its elected officials or judges to prevent the denial of the Plaintiffs civil rights guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution and laws of the United States at all times pertinent hereto.

COUNT I
INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL HARM
223. Plaintiff realleges herein all of the allegations set forth in paragraphs 1 through 222 of this complaint as if fully set forth herein, and further, the Plaintiff alleges that the jurisdiction of Count VI is invoked pursuant to the pendent jurisdiction of this Court.
224. The conduct of the Defendants and unknown Defendants John Does alleged herein and above constitutes intentional, knowing and reckless infliction of emotional distress as the Defendants' conduct in conspiring to have the Plaintiff indicted was extreme and outrageous conduct done intentionally or recklessly, and it caused severe emotional distress and harm to the Plaintiff, and the Defendants' conduct went beyond all reasonable bounds of decency.
225. As a direct and proximate result of said intentional, reckless conduct that exceeds all bounds usually tolerated by a decent society and an average member of the community would arouse his resentment against the Defendants by the Defendants' outrageous conduct, Plaintiff has suffered and will continue to suffer damages including, but not limited to, anxiety, serious mental distress and emotional trauma in an amount to be more fully determined at trial.
COUNT II
VIOLATION OF 42 U.S.C. 1983
226. Plaintiff realleges and reaffirms each and every allegation contained in Paragraphs 1 through 225 as if fully set forth herein.
227. Defendants at all time acted under color of statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage of the State of Indiana to subject the Plaintiff to the deprivation of rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution and law and caused injury to the Plaintiff, including but not limited to, the injuries previously set forth herein, including but not limited to the Plaintiffs incarceration in violation of the First Amendment, Sixth Amendment, Fourteenth Amendment, and 18 U.S.0 §241.
COUNT III
VIOLATION OF 42 U.S.C. 1985
228. Plaintiff realleges and reaffirms each and every allegation contained in Paragraphs 1 through 227 as if fully set forth herein.
229. Defendants conspired for the purpose of impeding, obstructing or defeating the due course of justice in the State of Indiana with intent to deny to the Plaintiff, a citizen of the United States, the equal protection of the laws, and/or to injure the Plaintiff or his property for lawfully enforcing or attempting to enforce his rights and the rights under the United States Constitution and to the equal protection of the laws as set forth herein and as a result thereof caused injury to the Plaintiff, including but not limited to the injuries previously set forth herein.
COUNT IV
VIOLATION OF 42 U.S.C. 1986
230. Plaintiff realleges and reaffirms each and every allegation contained in Paragraphs 1 through 229 as if fully set forth herein.
231. Defendants are persons who had knowledge that the wrongs conspired to be done and mentioned in 42 U.S.C. §1985 were about to be committed, and having power to prevent or aid in preventing the commission of the same, neglected or refused to do so, which said Defendants by reasonable diligence could have prevented, but the Defendants did nothing and as a result thereof caused injury to the Plaintiff, including but not limited to the injuries previously set forth herein.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully requests this Court to:
1. Enter a judgment finding that Defendants violated federal and Indiana law as set forth above;
2. Award compensatory damages that will reasonably compensate Plaintiff for his damages, including loss of employment, lost back wages or back pay, liquidated damages, and losses arising from adverse health effects, mental and emotional distress, and for humiliation, embarrassment, loss of reputation and loss of self-esteem;
3. Award Plaintiff an amount to be determined at trial for humiliation, embarrassment, loss of reputation, loss of self-esteem, emotional distress and pain and suffering in an amount that exceeds the minimum jurisdictional amount of this Court and as more fully proven at the trial of this matter for the Plaintiffs false arrest;
4. Award Plaintiff punitive damages in an amount to be determined at the trial of this matter, attorney fees and costs of this action;
5. Grant Plaintiff such other and further relief as may be just and equitable.

Daniel Brewington, after being duly cautioned and sworn, states that the allegations contained in the within complaint are true and accurate to the best of his knowledge and belief and he swears to same under penalty of perjury

Robert G. Kelly (00 a 167)
Trial Attorney for Plaintiff
4353 Montgomery Road
Norwood, Ohio 45212
513-531-3636
513-531-0135 Fax
E-mail address: rgkellycolpa@aol.com

JURY DEMAND
Plaintiff demands a trial by jury.
PRAECIPE:
Please serve all Defendants by certified mail return receipt requested at the following
addresses:
F. Aaron Negangard
individually and in his representative
capacity as Prosecutor of Dearborn
County, Indiana
215 West High Street
Lawrenceburg, Indiana 47025
Michael Kreinhop
individually and in his representative
capacity as Sheriff of Dearborn
County, Indiana
301 West High Street
Lawrenceburg, Indiana 47025
James Humphrey
1406 Indian Woods Trail
Lawrenceburg, Indiana 47025
Heidi Humphrey
1406 Indian Woods Trail
Lawrenceburg, Indiana 47025
Angela Loechel
310 West High Street
Lawrenceburg, Indiana 47025
Edward J. Connor
34 Erlanger Road
Erlanger, Kentucky 41018
Dearborn County, Indiana
do Andrew Baudendistel
Dearborn County Attorney
230 West High Street
Lawrenceburg, Indiana 47025
John Does, 1 through 25
names and addresses unknown

Attachment:
PROVISIONS TO SERVE AS AN IMPARTIAL EXPERT IN A CUSTODY EVALUATION
You, your child(ren) and the other parent are about to undergo a custody evaluation with Dr. Ed Connor and Dr. Sara Jones-Connor. As an impartial evaluator appointed by the Court, or agreed to by legal counsel or both parties, we make every reasonable effort to advise the Court on what is in the best interest of your child(ren). In order to conduct a competent and thorough evaluation, we must be free to access any and all information, from any available source that we consider pertinent to reaching our final conclusion. We may interview all members of the immediate family, contact extended family members such as grandparents, aunts, uncles, cousins, etc. We may also interview others who have had direct contact with the child(ren) or observed the child(ren) with either parent such as a friend, neighbor, supervisor, co-workers, housekeeper, baby sitter, law enforcement officials, day care provider, teachers, physician or mental health professional. The information we collect from you, your child(ren) and any collateral source, if deemed pertinent by us to substantiate the final recommendation, may be included in the final report to the Court. Each party, or person interviewed in my office, shall agree to sign a Release of Information and Consent Form. If a telephone interview is conducted the interviewee is informed that what is said may be included in the final recommendations sent to the Judge and a copy to each attorney (and the Guardian ad Litem if applicable). Your signature below indicates that we have your permission to release the custody report to the appropriate parties and contact any person we deem necessary.
EES:
The fee for conducting the entire custody evaluation, which includes interview sessions, parentchild observations, test Administration, scoring and interpretation, document review, collateral interviews, telephone interviews, a home visit with each parent (if within a 30 mile radius), possible school or day care visits, review of records, report preparation, typing and dictation is $110.00 per hour. The cost for a custody evaluation is $3200.00. **See note below. There is a $250.00 non-refundable payment due at each party's first interview and an additional $250.00 payment due at each party's second interview or $1000.00 by the parent who is courtordered to pay the entire evaluation fee. The report will be finalized as soon as the bill is paid in full. The evaluation takes about 90 to 120 days so please make arrangements to pay your bill within that time frame. We will not finalize the report until each party has paid their bill in full.
**Note: If sexual abuse or domestic violence allegations against either party is asserted or has been substantiated during the course of the custody evaluation, additional sessions and assessment will be required. The cost for the additional sessions and/or assessment will be incurred by the parties equally or the party ordered to pay for the evaluation in full on an hourly rate.
DISPOSITION OR TESTIMONY FEE;
If your attorney Subpoenas either and/or both examiners) for a deposition or for testimony at the final hearing, your attorney will be asked to submit a $750.00 retainer per doctor no late: than two weeks prior to the deposition or court appearance. The fee for a deposition is $125.00 per hour scheduled deposing time and $125.00 per preparation hour, not to exceed 3 hours. The fee for testimony is $125.00 per hour door-to-door and $125.00 per preparation hour, not to exceed three hours. Following the deposition or final hearing, the remainder of the fee, if any, will be billed to your attorney. Be sure to inform your attorney of this procedure, as he/she will probably, in turn, bill you. Please note that our schedules are usually booked four weeks in advance and we will need a minimum five-week notice for a deposition or testimony.
ADDITIONAL PEES:
If your attorney requests a copy of the file please be advised that The American Psychological Association prohibits us from releasing psychological test data to non-psychologists. However, we are permitted to release the data to another Psychologist after their name and address has been provided to us. Please note that we are not permitted to release your ex-spouse's test data without their consent even to another psychologist. The cost for file copying_ is 100 per page, • postage and a $20.00 administration fee to be paid in advance.
ABOUT TEEE EVALUATION PROCESS:
It is our opinion that in a Custody dispute there are no winners. Everyone loses something. The law requires that we who are involved act in the "best interest of the child," which may sometimes go against our wishes or desires. Regardless, each adult involved in any Custody case must act in a thoughtful and rational manner and protect the child from undue stress and emotional harm The best advice we can give you is to be totally honest throughout the course of this evaluation.
1. Please do not ask your child what he/she and the doctor talked about during his/her sessions.
If a child feels this type of pressure from a parent during a custody evaluation they often "shutdown" which significantly complicates the evaluation process. Our advice to you as a parent is to simply tell your child that he/she is going to the "Talking Doctor" together with you to see how your family is doing.
2. We will not discuss our thoughts about possible recommendations during the evaluation process_ so please do not ask. When the report has been submitted to the proper authorities, you may then ask your attorney for feedback from the report. After the final custody judgment has been rendered, we will be happy to review your psychological test results with you free of charge.
3. will review any documents, audiotapes or videotapes. However, we will only review documents or tapes if You Provide us with a copy of each item. These copies will not be returned to you at the conclusion of the evaluation. These items become part of the file and must remain in your file.
4. At no time is anyone permitted to tape record a session without our knowledge. If permission is granted to tape record, we will inform both attorneys of the procedure. Your signature below indicates that you agree to adhere to this policy.
5. After you have reviewed the final report with your attorney, you are encouraged to submit, in writing, if there are any errors, i.e., demographics, ages, time at one job, historical dates, etc. After receiving your statements in writing, we will then make note of such errors in your file and write an Addendum if necessary.

Your signature below indicates that:
I. You have read the "Provisions To Serve As An Impartial Evaluator in a Custody Evaluation" and that you fully understand the document and have therefore willingly
signed this document.
2. You have read the "Release of Information and Consent" form and fully understand the document.
3. You agree to fah-111 your financial obligation and pay your portion of the assessment fee as stipulated by the Judge/Commissioner, while freely acknowledging that Dr. Connor and/or Dr. Jones-Connor may not support your position in this case.

Thank You,
Ed Connor, Psy.D., R.C.E.
Licensed Psychologist
KY License 41007
Registered Custody Evaluator
Sara Jones-Connor. Ph.D. •
Licensed Psychologist
KY License 41256
Signature of Mother 'Date
Custcontrac:t(HRLY).do:.^.